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Emotional Distress Damages:
Should They Be Permitted Under the Bankruptcy Code
for a Willful Violation of the Stay
Ralph C. McCullough, H*
I. INTRODUCTION
An emerging topic in bankruptcy law is whether the term "actual
damages" includes damages for emotional injury.' If such a recovery
is possible, then it must come from 11 U.S.C. §362 which provides in
pertinent part that: "[a]n individual injured by any willful violation of
a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including
costs and attorney's' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may re-
cover punitive damages."'2 This article will explore how certain bank-
ruptcy courts have dealt with the issue of emotional damages and
compensation for willful violations of automatic stays, through a de-
tailed examination of lower court decisions and the two appellate
court decisions that have addressed these issues. It is becoming quite
apparent that bankruptcy courts, district courts and appellate courts
are willing to compensate a debtor, under appropriate circumstances,
for emotional injury when a creditor willfully violates the automatic
stay.
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1. See, e.g., Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 878 (7th Cir. 2001).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2002).
340 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1:339
II. WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATION STAY
A debtor must prove that a creditor has willfully violated the auto-
matic stay in order to recover damages pursuant to §362(h). 3 All
courts agree that the debtor bears the burden of proving that the vio-
lation was willful. However, the courts disagree as to what standard
of proof the debtor must establish in order to prove a willful viola-
tion. 4 Bankruptcy courts have also been divergent about the definition
of what constitutes a willful violation of the automatic stay. The es-
sential elements appear to be: 1) notice of the bankruptcy; and 2) a
deliberate act that violates the stay.5 However, as noted in In re Put-
nam,6 an early court used a "more narrow definition [which] finds a
willful violation when 'a deliberate and intentional act [is] done with
the knowledge that the act is in violation of the stay."' 7 Most courts
have rejected the narrow requirement that a creditor know the act is
in violation of the stay, and only requires that the creditor's act is in-
tentional and violates the stay.8 Most courts also agree that the credi-
tor need not have the specific intent of violating the stay to commit a
willful violation and that the creditor's good faith belief that they are
entitled to the property is not relevant to the inquiry of whether the
violation was willful.9
3. See In re Bennett, 135 B.R. 72 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
4. See, e.g., Boone v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re Boone), 235 B.R. 828, 833 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1998) (clear and convincing evidence); Diviney v. Bank of Tex. (In re Diviney), 211 B.R. 951, 961
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1997) (clear and convincing evidence); Meis-Nachtrab v. Griffin (In re Meis-
Nachtrab), 190 B.R. 302, 305 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (preponderance standard); In re Sielaff,
164 B.R. 560, 571 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994) (preponderance standard); In re Bennett, 135 B.R.
at 76 (clear and convincing evidence).
5. See, e.g., Covington v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Covington), 256 B.R. 463, 466 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 2000) ("In order to find a willful violation of the stay, all this Court needs to find is that
'the entity engaged in a deliberate act to violate the stay with the knowledge that the debtor has
filed for bankruptcy.' Where actual notice of the bankruptcy case is proven, a violation of the
stay is presumed." (citations omitted)); In re Carrigan, 109 B.R. 167, 171 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
1989) ("'Willful' means intentional or deliberate conduct. A willful violation occurs when a
creditor with notice of the bankruptcy case nevertheless performs one of the acts prohibited by
§ 362(a)." (citations omitted)).
6. 167 B.R. 737 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994).
7. Id. at 740 (quoting Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. v. Lipke (In re Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc.), 54 B.R. 905, 909 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1985).
8. See sources cited supra note 5.
9. See Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265, 268-69 (1st Cir. 1999); In re
Diviney, 211 B.R. at 966; see also United States v. Flynn (In re Flynn), 185 B.R. 89, 92 (S.D. Ga.
1995) (applying the same definition of willfulness to a government creditor).
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III. EMOTIONAL DAMAGES FOR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF
THE AUTOMATIC STAY
Although the topic of whether emotional damages should be com-
pensable under § 362(h) as actual damages has only become a highly
contested topic in the past few years, some bankruptcy courts have
awarded damages for emotional injury as far back as the 1980s.10 This
section will examine the decisions of bankruptcy and district courts on
the topic, according to whether or not the court awarded damages for
emotional distress.
A. Emotional Damages Not Awarded
In re Brockington" involved a debtor who filed for bankruptcy on
March 16, 1990.12 Six days later on March 22, the creditor repossessed
the debtor's automobile. 13 Even though the bankruptcy notice was
not sent out until the day before the repossession, the court found that
the debtor informed the creditor of the bankruptcy filing and had of-
fered to substantiate the filing in time to stop the repossession, but the
creditor was not interested. 14 Ultimately, the car was returned on
March 23, after the creditor confirmed the bankruptcy filing.1 5 The
court awarded the debtor damages for lost wages and also awarded
punitive damages, but refused to award the debtor emotional damages
because he "failed to meet his burden of proof as to any causal con-
nection between the repossession of his vehicle and any medical treat-
ment resulting from an alleged aggravation of his pre-existing heart
condition. ' 16 The court also would not allow the debtor to recover
payment of his hospital expenses, physician's bill, or radiological bill
because of the lack of causal connection.' 7 Even though the court did
not award actual damages for emotional distress, it did award punitive
damages. 18 Where the creditor's conduct is egregious, courts will usu-
ally find a way to punish the creditors' actions.
10. See In re Shropshire, 25 B.R. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982) (awarding $2,500 in damages
for humiliation, being demeaned, and for damage to his reputation in the community); Lugo v.
De Jesus (In re De Jesus Saez), 20 B.R. 19 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1982) (awarding $2,500 in damages to
a debtor for mental anguish); In re Gibson, 16 B.R. 682 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (awarding $100
in damages to a debtor for harassment and inconvenience based on civil contempt).
11. 129 B.R. 68 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1991).
12. Id. at 69.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Brockington, 129 B.R. at 69.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 71.
18. Id.
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In re Briggs19 involved a debtor who owed a credit union on both a
secured and unsecured loan.20 The credit union froze the debtor's
share account, made him sign reaffirmation agreements on both debts
(the debtor only wanted to sign a reaffirmation agreement on one of
the debts) without allowing the debtor to file the agreements with the
court, and implied to the debtor that he was responsible for terminat-
ing automated payments of the secured loan from the share account. 21
The court determined that the creditor willfully violated the stay, not
by freezing the share account, but by having the debtor sign reaffirma-
tion agreements and not allowing him to file them with the court and
by implying that he had the affirmative duty to terminate the bank
drafts.22 The court noted that if a debtor can prove that there is actual
injury, then damages for mental anguish can be awarded. 23 However,
the debtor in this case was unable to prove actual injury because "the
only evidence submitted at the hearing in support of his contention
that he experienced any kind of trauma as a result of the Credit
Union's actions was the Debtor's own vague and conclusory testimony
to that effect."' 24 The court found that this type of testimony did not
prove "specific and definite evidence" of emotional injury and there-
fore did not award the debtor any emotional damages. 25 Apparently,
the lack of medical testimony precluded an award for emotional dis-
tress and although the court also refused to award punitive damages,
it did award attorney's fees. 26 The court found that the creditors ac-
tions were deceptive, but were not so reprehensible as to justify an
award of punitive damages. 27 In re Putnam28 involved the debtors'
purchase of a propane tank from the creditor, which they used for
space heating, water heating, and cooking and on June 24, 1992, the
debtors filed for bankruptcy.29 On July 6, the creditor removed the
propane tank from the debtor's residence.3° Even though the debtor's
attorney called the creditor and faxed them notice of the bankruptcy
on July 7, the creditor did not return the tank until the court ordered it
19. 143 B.R. 438 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992).
20. Id. at 441.
21. Id. at 441-43.
22. Id. at 464.
23. In re Briggs, 143 B.R. at 463.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 463-64.
27. In re Briggs, 143 B.R. at 464.
28. 167 B.R. 737 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994).




to on July 9.31 The court determined that the creditor's refusal to re-
turn the tank after having knowledge of the automatic stay was a will-
ful violation of the stay. 32 However, the court examined the issue
using the minority view of what constitutes "actual damages" under
section 362(h). The court held that the debtor could not recover com-
pensatory damages for humiliation and inconvenience as a result of
the creditors' actions, "there is no evidence that this request is for
actual damages as required by section 362(h). ' 33 In re Putnam is
unique among decisions denying recovery of emotional damages be-
cause it held that emotional damages were not actual damages. 34 The
court also did not award punitive damages and only awarded a portion
of the attorney's fees to the debtor's attorney. 35 The result in this case
is a little surprising considering the creditor's refusal to return the
tank, even though it knew that its actions were in violation of the au-
tomatic stay.
In re Diviney,36 a case with a long and complicated history, involved
a debtor who had filed for bankruptcy three times.37 The third bank-
ruptcy case had been dismissed, but was later reinstated.38 The credi-
tor repossessed the debtor's car after the third case had already been
reinstated and refused to return the car unless arrangements were
made to pay the debt and to assure the bank that the car was in-
sured.39 The court concluded that the actions of the bank were a will-
ful violation of the stay40 and awarded actual damages and attorney's
fees.4 1 However, the court refused to award the debtors damages for
"the humiliation, anguish and duress they suffered because of the
Bank's intentional stay violations. ' 42 The court noted that the debtors
did not produce any medical testimony in support of their claim for
emotional damages. 43 Here, the "only evidence of any emotional dis-
tress is found in testimony that conversations between the Bank and
31. Id. at 738-39.
32. In re Putnam, 167 B.R. at 740.
33. Id. at 741.
34. See, e.g., Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 881 (7th Cir. 2001).
35. In re Putnam, 167 B.R. at 739, 741.
36. 211 B.R. 951 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1997).
37. Id. at 956.
38. Id. at 956-58.
39. Id. at 958-60.
40. In re Diviney, 211 BR. at 966-67.
41. Id. at 967.
42. Id.
43. Id. The court also noted that even though the debtors cited two cases where emotional
damages were awarded without medical testimony, those cases involved a "much clearer show-
ing of emotional distress." Id. at 967-68. See In re Flynn, 169 B.R. 1007, 1023 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
1994); In re Carrigan, 109 B.R. 167 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1989).
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the Debtors became heated at times, and that profanity was used in at
least one of those conversations. ' 44 The court found that, without
medical testimony, the debtors' testimony did not support damages
for emotional distress.45 The court did find that the bank's violation
was egregious and awarded punitive damages of $40,000 and cancelled
any future payments the bank was to collect under the plan.46
In re Skeen,47 involved a debtor who claimed that the creditor had
called her home two times, after she filed for Chapter 7 relief, threat-
ening to repossess her china hutch if she did not make a payment.48
The creditor claimed that they had only made one phone call, that the
call was made before receiving notice of the bankruptcy, and that it
was not harassing.49 The court first determined that there was no will-
ful violation of the stay.50 However, the court still considered the
debtors' damage claim for the benefit of future litigants and noted
that a damage award for a violation of the automatic stay must not be
speculative. 5' Mrs. Skeen had testified that she was torn-up, shaken
and nervous for the rest of the day because of the phone calls, but the
court found it significant that she had not sought medical help for her
emotional distress.5 2 Mrs. Skeen also called her attorney and was as-
sured that the china hutch would not be repossessed.5 3 As a result, the
court found "'because the emotional distress suffered ... was fleeting,
inconsequential, and medically insignificant, . . . it is not compensa-
ble."' 54 Here, it was clear that if there was any damage done to the
debtor, she was quickly reassured by her attorney that the creditor
could not repossess the hutch, so any emotional distress was
unjustified.
In re Shade55 involved a debtor who was approached and harassed
by an employee of her creditor in the hallway following her section
341 hearing.5 6 The creditor demanded payment of the debt.57 The
44. In re Diviney, 211 B.R. at 967.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 969-70.
47. 248 B.R. 312 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000).
48. Id. at 314.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 318.
51. In re Skeen, 248 B.R. at 318 (citing Archer v. Macomb County Bank, 853 F.2d 497, 500
(6th Cir. 1988)).
52. Id. at 318-19.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 319 (quoting Crispell v. Landmark Bank (In re Crispell), 73 B.R. 375, 380 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1987)).
55. 261 B.R. 213 (Bankr. C.D. 111. 2001).




debtor broke down into tears and went to her attorney, who then ap-
proached the creditor and demanded that he leave his client alone.58
The attorney had to leave with the debtor because she was too shaken
up to do so on her own. 59 The court did not allow recovery of the
economic damages because it was bound by the decision in Aiello v.
Providian Financial Corp., which held that purely economic damages
were not authorized by §362(h). 60 The debtor's only damages resulted
from the Creditor's harassment and therefore, in the Seventh Circuit,
she could not recover for her emotional damages. However, the court
awarded the debtor both attorney's fees and punitive damages be-
cause of the creditor's egregious behavior. 61
B. Emotional Damages Awarded
In re Mercer,62 involved one of the most flagrant abuses of the auto-
matic stay. The debtor filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy on January 4,
1985.63 The defendant creditor was Color Tyme T.V. Rental, which
was a rent-to-own business. 64 On January 8, an employee of the credi-
tor contacted Mrs. Mercer on the telephone.65 She informed him of
the bankruptcy, but the employee still demanded payment or return
of the equipment. 66 On January 10, the employee called again with
the same demands. 67 Then on January 11, two employees appeared at
Mrs. Mercer's home, but they were told that Mrs. Mercer was not at
home and left without incident.68 Mrs. Mercer then contacted her at-
torney, who called the manager of Color Tyme and informed him that
he could not repossess the stereo.69 Nevertheless, the manager di-
rected his employees to return to Mrs. Mercer's home, on the same
day, and repossess the stereo.70 The employees kicked and pounded
on the door for approximately five to ten minutes.71 Finally, Mrs.
Mercer's small children unlocked the door and the employees came in
58. Id.
59. In re Shade, 261 B.R. at 215.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 215-18.
62. 48 B.R. 562 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
63. Id. at 563.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. In re Mercer, 48 B.R. at 563.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 564.
69. Id.
70. In re Mercer, 48 B.R. at 564.
71. Id.
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uninvited and repossessed the stereo. 72 The court awarded Mrs. Mer-
cer $510.00 to replace her door, attorney's fees, and punitive dam-
ages.73 In addition, the court awarded Mrs. Mercer $1,000 for the
"humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety and frustration she suffered in
the incident. ' 74 An award of emotional damages was justified in these
circumstances even without medical testimony. What debtor would
not be intimidated and shaken up if all creditors resorted to this type
of conduct?
In re Carrigan75 also involved a flagrant abuse of the automatic stay.
The debtor filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy on January 10, 1989.76 An
individual creditor appeared at the debtor's home on March 12 and
demanded the money that the debtor owed.77 When the debtor in-
structed the creditor to contact his attorney, the creditor stated, "I
don't want to talk to that son of a bitch; I want my money. '78 The
creditor admitted going to the debtor's home, but claimed that he was
a perfect gentleman throughout the entire encounter.7 9 However, the
court accepted the debtor's version of the events and rejected the
creditor's version in its entirety.80 The court first found that there was
a willful violation of the stay.8' The court then reached the question
of what damages should be awarded for the egregious violation of the
stay.82 The court stated:
The debtor's actual injury here is somewhat imprecise, but it is real
- and, it is certainly the result of the actions of [the creditor]. As-
sessing the value of this type of injury is not susceptible to a formula
or precise measurement. However, the outrageous nature of [the
creditor's] actions is sufficiently strong to produce the anxiety ex-
pressed by the debtor.83
72. id.
73. Id. at 565-66 (awarding $1,907.99 for attorney's fees and $5,000 for punitive damages re-
sulting from the violation and contempt).
74. In re Mercer, 48 B.R. at 565.
75. 109 B.R. 167 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1989).
76. Id. at 168.
77. Id.
78. Id. (noting that throughout the entire confrontation the creditor was both abusive and
loud).
79. In re Carrigan, 109 B.R. at 169.
80. Id. at 169-70 (stating that the creditor's testimony "was too well tailored, contrived and
just not believable").
81. Id. at 170-71.
82. Id. at 170-72. This is one of the cases cited in In re Diviney, which allowed emotional
damages without the need for medical testimony because it was obvious that injury occurred.
211 B.R. 951 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1997).
83. In re Carrigan, 109 B.R. at 171-72.
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The court awarded the debtors $1,000 in emotional damages.84 Again,
the violation in this case would obviously have an adverse affect on
any debtor.
In In re Jacobs,85 American Express continued to attempt to collect
on an unsecured debt even after the debtor's attorney informed them
that the debtor was in bankruptcy and that their actions were in viola-
tion of the stay. American Express subsequently hired two different
collection agencies, who continued attempts to collect the debt.8 6 The
debtor's attorney also informed the collection agencies of the bank-
ruptcy, but continued to attempt collection of the debt.8 7 The court
found that American Express had willfully violated the automatic
stay.88 The court stated that American Express "repeatedly harassed
the Debtor in an attempt to collect its pre-petition debt. ' 89 The court
also found that the two collection agencies hired by American Express
to collect the debt used embarrassing and humiliating tactics in trying
to recover the unsecured debt owed to American Express.90 The
court awarded the debtor $200 for embarrassment and humiliation,91
despite the fact that the debtor presented no medical evidence of his
emotional damages. Although the award for emotional distress was
modest, the court also awarded the debtor's attorney fees and punitive
damages. 92
In re Fisher,93 involved another case of egregious conduct on the
part of the creditors. After the debtor filed for bankruptcy on June
28, 1991, a man hired to repossess her car called a few days later and
said that if she did not turn over the car, she would be committing a
"criminal felony. ' 94 The debtor then contacted her attorney, who im-
mediately called the repossessor and informed him that the car was
protected under the automatic stay. 95  The court noted that
"[n]otwithstanding [the attorney's] emphatic admonitions, Clemente
[the repossessor] stated, inter alia that: He didn't care if the Debtor
84. Id. at 172.
85. 100 B.R. 357 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
86. Id. at 358-59.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 360 (stating that "it is difficult to conceive of a more flagrant violation of the auto-
matic stay than that committed by American Express in this case").
89. In re Jacobs, 100 B.R. at 360.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (awarding attorney fees in the amount of $500 and punitive damages in the amount of
$1,500).
93. 144 B.R. 237 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992).
94. Id. at 237-38.
95. Id. at 238.
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had filed bankruptcy; he wasn't satisfied that she had in fact filed...;
he had a repossession order that he intended to carry out; and basi-
cally, that was enough. ' 96 Clemente then attended the section 341
hearing, not for the sole purpose of questioning the debtor, but also to
repossess the car.97 After the meeting ended, the car was repossessed
from the courthouse parking lot, despite warnings from the debtor's
attorney, the trustee, and several others that the conduct was illegal.98
The creditor argued that the trustee had consented to the repossession
at the section 341 hearing, but the court rejected this contention.99The
Court found that the Defendant's actions: "(1) contacting the Debtor
post-bankruptcy for the express purpose of harassing and threatening
her; and (2) in forcefully repossessing her vehicle despite clear and
repeated warnings against such action" were a willful violation of the
stay. 100 The court awarded $1,000 compensatory damages for embar-
rassment and emotional distress based on the creditor's conduct. 10
The court awarded the damages without any medical testimony re-
garding the debtor's emotional injury. 02 The court also added an
award of punitive damages and attorney fees. 0 3
In In re Flynn,10 4 the IRS levied the debtor's checking account be-
cause of back taxes that she owed. 0 5 As a result, the account was
subsequently frozen. 10 6 The debtor called the IRS office and a repre-
sentative admitted that the account should not have been frozen and
assured the debtor that they would remove by the end of the day. 10 7
However, the levy was not released until a week after the IRS admit-
ted that the levy had been placed on the account improperly. 08 The
debtor testified, that "she suffered extreme emotional distress after
receiving the letter from Nationsbank. She was forced to cancel her
96. Id.
97. In re Fisher, 144 B.R. at 238.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 238-39 (accepting testimony of Trustee that he "'would never advise a creditor to do
this' and that he advised Clemente and Jefferson that 'I don't think you have the right to take
the car-but I'm not the Judge"').
100. Id. at 239.
101. In re Fisher, 144 B.R. at 239-40.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 240 (ordering Defendants are jointly and severally liable for reasonable legal fees
acquired by Debtor and $4,000 in punitive damages for Defendants' willful and malicious viola-
tion of automatic stay).
104. 185 B.R. 89 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
105. Id. at 91.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. In re Flynn, 185 B.R. at 91 (noting that a copy of the release was not faxed until the next
week even though the release was prepared that day and the original mailed to NationsBank).
[Vol. 1:339
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eleven year old son's birthday party. She suffered embarrassment and
humiliation when she was stopped in a check-out line at Kroger be-
cause a previous check had bounced."'10 9 Even though representatives
of the IRS testified that the levy was placed on the debtor's account
due to "internal procedure problems", the court held that the IRS's
violation was willful.110 The IRS argued that the debtor could not re-
cover for emotional distress because she did not introduce any medi-
cal testimony."' However, the court stated that medical testimony
was not necessary in this case:
In this case, it is clear that appellee suffered emotional harm as a
direct result of the violation of the automatic stay and the resulting
freeze on her checking account. She was forced to cancel her son's
birthday party, embarrassed in the check-out line at the supermar-
ket and justifiably worried that her checks would bounce due to the
freeze on her account. All of these events justify an award of dam-
ages for emotional distress regardless of whether medical testimony
is provided.1 12
In cases involving egregious conduct by government agencies, courts
may be more willing to award damages for emotional distress because
punitive damages are barred under section 106(a)(3)" 13
In In re Solfanelli," 4 the debtors owed the bank $4.8 million dollars
on a debt that was secured by shares of stock and real estate. 15 The
bank sought to lift the automatic stay and, in an effort to avoid this
result, the debtors entered into a Stipulation and Security Agree-
ment." 6 The debtors later breached the Agreement, so the bank de-
clared a default and garnished various pre-petition accounts, several
of which contained post-petition funds." 7 The bank's actions violated
the automatic stay and the court determined that the violation was
willful." 8 The court then moved on to the issue of damages and
stated:
Mrs. Solfanelli presented no evidence of monetary damages. Never-
theless, we find that her testimony was sufficient for this court to
establish the existence of embarrassment, humiliation, and mental
anguish. She had no reason to believe, even upon default, that her
post-petition deposits would be at risk without notice to her. When
109. Id.
110. Id. at 92.
111. Id. at 92-93.
112. In re Flynn, 185 B.R. at 93.
113. Id.
114. 206 B.R. 699 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1996).
115. Id. at 702.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. In re Solfanelli, 206 B.R. at 702-703.
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those deposits did not support the checks written against them be-
cause the funds had been removed, she was understandably embar-
rassed. While we all suffer humiliation and embarrassment at
various stages of our life, a finding that this was caused by the
Bank's violation of the automatic stay is sufficient to support an
award under 11 U.S.C. §362(h). [citations omitted] 119
The court only awarded the debtors $1.00 for emotional distress, but
stated that the award would allow the debtor's to recover their attor-
ney's fees. 120
In re Holden'2' involved a debtor who owed $184.92 in back taxes
to the IRS, but was also entitled to a $2,050 tax refund from the
IRS. 122 The IRS froze the tax refund after the debtors filed for bank-
ruptcy because of the outstanding debt owed to the IRS. 123 The IRS
offered to release the tax refund if the debtors would pay the $184.92
they owed the IRS out of the tax refund, but the IRS never attempted
to have the automatic stay lifted. 124 The debtors fell behind on their
mortgage payments during this time because they were planning to
make those payments with the tax refund; 25 "Debtors home was now
in jeopardy and the mortgagee was a neighbor. Others on their neigh-
bor's block would soon know the Holdens' precarious situation.
Hence, the Debtors' claim for emotional distress.' 26 The court
looked at several other cases involving the IRS and claims for emo-
tional distress. 127 The IRS argued that emotional damages should only
be awarded where "there is intent to inflict emotional distress or phys-
ical contact or the threat of physical contact."1 28 The court rejected
the IRS's argument:
[B]ecause we believe §362 contemplates damages for emotional dis-
tress. Emotional distress is an actual injury. Our emotions can
wreak havoc with our nervous system, often having physical side
effects. Emotional distress is not an ethereal proposition or an in-
119. Id. at 703.
120. Id.
121. 226 B.R. 809 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998).
122. Id. at 810.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. In re Holden, 226 B.R. at 810-11.
126. Id. at 811.
127. Id. at 811-12. The cases included In re Matthews, 184 B.R. 594, 601 (Bankr. S.D. Ala.
1995) (allowing emotional damages to a debtor where the IRS had seized their tax refund post-
petition because "[t]he court found the IRS' actions 'clearly inappropriate'"); In re Flynn, 169
B.R. 1007 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994); In re Washington, 172 B.R. 415 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) (deny-
ing the debtor damages for emotional distress where the debtor's injury was "'fleeting and in-
consequential"'); In re Davis, 201 B.R. 835 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1996) (allowing emotional
damages where the IRS' willful violation of the stay caused debtors to bounce several checks).
128. Id. at 812.
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tangible concept. The stress is felt not by the inanimate object, the
check bouncing or the account freezing. Rather, the emotions be-
long to and are felt by the owner of the bounced check and the
frozen account. 129
The court determined that they would allow medical testimony to de-
termine the extent of the emotional distress and what damages, if any,
the debtor was entitled to recover for the IRS's willful violation of the
stay.130 This case also involved a claim against a government agency
and, therefore, no punitive damages could be recovered against the
IRS for the willful violation.
In re Boone,31 was a case where the FDIC initiated foreclosure
proceedings against the Boones, who then filed for Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy. The debtors paid FDIC under the plan until the debt was sat-
isfied. 32 After the debt was discharged, the FDIC transferred title to
themselves by Marshal's deed. 133 The debtor's attorney contacted the
FDIC about the violation of the stay, but the FDIC refused to recon-
vey title to the debtors. 134 The court determined that the FDIC's vio-
lation of the stay was willful. 135 The court awarded $5,000 for
emotional distress because "[t]hey have been unable to view their
home as theirs, unable to refinance it to improve their lifestyle, unable
to spend monies to repair or improve the home or otherwise on their
children in fear of further action by the FDIC, all without a single
effort by the FDIC to remedy the wrong that took place."' 136 The
FDIC's willful violation of the stay and egregious conduct in refusing
to reconvey title back to the debtor caused these problems. 37 This
case also involved a motion for sanctions against a government agency
in which punitive damages were not available.
In In re Covington,13s the IRS mailed a Notice of Intent to Levy to
the debtors after they had already filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
The IRS stopped the collection efforts after the debtor's attorney
called the IRS.139 However, the IRS had already received notice that
the debtor was in bankruptcy. 140 The court determined that the viola-
129. In re Holden, 226 B.R. at 812.
130. Id.
131. 235 B.R. 828 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1998).
132. Id. at 831.
133. Id. at 831-32.
134. Id. at 833.
135. In re Boone, 225 B.R. at 834.
136. Id. at 838.
137. Id.
138. 256 B.R. 463 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2000).
139. Id. at 465.
140. Id. at 464-65.
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tion of the stay was willful because the IRS had received actual notice
of the bankruptcy.141 The court then turned to the issue of whether
the debtor could recover for emotional distress because of the IRS's
willful violation of the stay.' 42 The court explained that several other
courts have found emotional distress to be an actual damage under
§362(h). 143 The court also explained that there is a split of authority
over whether medical testimony is needed to prove emotional dis-
tress. 144 The Covington court allowed the debtor to recover for emo-
tional distress without any medical testimony. 45 The South Carolina
Department of Revenue had previously levied the debtors' account
and the court determined that this was very important to their "state
of mind."' 46 The debtors knew what a levy was and "[t]his Court be-
lieves that the debtors did suffer emotional injury as a result of receiv-
ing the 'Notice of Intent to Levy'. This Court believes that peace of
mind is invaluable and will award $1000.00 to compensate the debtors
for the trauma they endured during the period of time the IRS vio-
lated the stay."' 47 The court also found the IRS's actions were egre-
gious, but could not award punitive damages, so may therefore have
been more inclined to award emotional damages.
In In re Ocasio,148 the debtor owed an individual creditor $425. The
debtor and creditor coincidentally ran into each other.149 The debtor
testified that the creditor came up to him, asked him about the status
of the case, and called him a "cuckhold". 50 The debtor also testified
that the creditor told him that he had one day to come up with the
money, or "otherwise I know where I can get it from. I'm going to get
it from your face."'' The creditor testified that he merely asked the
debtor about the status of the case and that he called the debtor lazy
and irresponsible. 52 The debtor claimed that he feared for his safety,
became "hysterical," and was given medication for his nerves. 53 The
141. Id. at 466.
142. In re Covington, 256 B.R. at 467.
143. Id. (citing Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 1999); In re
Holden, 226 B.R. 809 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998); In re Davis, 201 B.R. at 837; In re Flynn, 169 B.R.
1007 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994)).
144. Id.
145. Id. This may have been because the debtor was a medical doctor.
146. In re Covington, 256 B.R. at 467.
147. Id.
148. 272 B.R. 815 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2002).
149. Id. at 820.
150. Id. Calling someone a "cuckhold" means your wife is cheating on you.
151. Id.




bankruptcy court awarded the debtor $1,000 in actual damages. 154 The
bankruptcy appellate panel for the First Circuit was bound by the ear-
lier decision in Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb.155 The court
found that the creditor's actions were a willful violation of the stay.156
The bankruptcy court awarded the actual damages based on the
debtor and his spouse's testimony.1 57 The court found that there was
ample evidence of actual damages because of the embarrassment,
threats, and the fact that the debtor was forced to seek medical treat-
ment. 158 The court awarded the damages for emotional distress even
though the only proof of the distress was the testimony that the debtor
went to the doctor and was put on medication. 159 However, one must
question why the court did not require some kind of verification (i.e.,
medical records or prescription forms). It was probably because the
court got to view the witnesses and believed the debtor's assertion
that he feared for his safety because of the threats.
IV. EMOTIONAL DAMAGES FOR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE
AUTOMATIC STAY: Two COURTS OF APPEAL
LAY DOWN THE VERDICT
During the past twenty years, only bankruptcy courts and district
courts had attempted to interpret whether § 362(h) authorized emo-
tional damages for willful violations of the stay. In fact, until 1999, no
court of appeals had interpreted whether § 362(h) authorized emo-
tional damages. In the last three years, however, two court of appeals
decisions have helped flesh out the law on the subject.160 Although
the two courts reached different results, it appears that both courts
would award emotional damages to a debtor for a willful violation of
the stay in the appropriate circumstances.
In Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Kaneb,16' the debtor (Kaneb), who
filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy in 1993, maintained residences in both
Florida and Massachusetts. The Massachusetts residence was sold to
pay secured creditors and Kaneb converted his case to a Chapter 7
bankruptcy. 162 In addition to the other residences, Kaneb also lived in
154. Id. at 821-22.
155. 196 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 1999).
156. In re Ocasio, 272 B.R. at 824.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 824-25.
160. See Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001); Fleet Mortgage Group,
Inc. v. Kaneb, 196 F.3d 265 (1st Cir. 1999).
161. 196 F.3d 265 (lst Cir. 1999).
162. Id. at 267
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a Florida condominium,, to which Shawmut Bank, N.A. held the origi-
nal mortgage. 163 Shawmut then merged with Fleet in 1995.164 Follow-
ing unsuccessful negotiations between Shawmut and Kaneb, Shawmut
forwarded the file for foreclosure. 65
The file contained both an order of discharge and an unsigned order
granting relief from the automatic stay.1 66 The attorney for the law
firm representing Shawmut (which had now merged with Fleet) be-
lieved that the order of discharge allowed Fleet to proceed with the
foreclosure. 67 After Fleet began foreclosure proceedings, Kaneb's at-
torney informed Fleet's counsel of the automatic stay. 68 They placed
his file on hold status and did not dismiss the foreclosure suit until six
weeks later. 69
Kaneb's neighbors learned of the foreclosure, based on a notice
published in the newspaper and "a barrage of colorful mail offering
legal and investment services" - some of which ended up in his
neighbors boxes and some of which were discovered by his neighbors
who were checking his mail for him while he was in Massachusetts -
during the period when his file was on hold with Fleet. 70 His neigh-
bors began to snub him after they learned that foreclosure proceed-
ings had been initiated against his Florida condominium.' 71 Many
within the community were affluent retirees who stopped inviting
Kaneb to social gatherings after they learned he had filed for
bankruptcy. 172
The court held that the standard for determining that a violation of
the stay was willful is that the creditor has knowledge of the stay and
that the creditor intended the actions that violated the stay. 173 Once
the creditor has actual notice of the stay, as was the case here, the
violation is presumed to be willful.' 74 Shawmut and Fleet had actual
notice of the automatic stay because they even attempted to obtain
163. Id. at 266-67.
164. Id. at 267.
165. Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc., 196 F.3d at 267.
166. Id.
167. Id. This belief was, of course, incorrect as an order of discharge releases a debtor from
personal liability on all debts dischargeable under § 523. The unsigned order also did not grant
Fleet the requested relief, so that the attempted foreclosure was a violation of the stay. Id. at
267.
168. Id.




173. Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc., 196 F.3d at 269.
174. Id.
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relief from the stay. 175 Fleet did not dismiss the foreclosure proceed-
ings until six weeks after Kaneb's attorney reminded them of the
stay.176 Therefore, the violation of the automatic stay was willful. 177
The lower court awarded Kaneb $25,000 for mental anguish. 178
Fleet appealed the award arguing that there was insufficient evidence
of harm and that there was no physical injury or corroborating testi-
mony. 179 The court only considered Fleet's argument that the evi-
dence was insufficient to award damages for emotional harm.180 The
court found that Kaneb provided "specific information" about the
emotional harm that he suffered. 18' This harm included a decline in
the number of social outings he was invited to attend.' 82
He then testified about the emotional distress he experienced be-
cause of these changes in his life: '[It]s very irritating. I don't sleep
well. My eating habits have changed. I - I don't feel that ambitious
about getting out and doing things and meeting people. It's - it's
not a pleasant situation to be in .... I'm worried concerning where
am I going to live. ' 183
The court held that the actual damages suffered by Kaneb must in-
clude damages for his emotional distress and allowed the $25,000
award to stand. 84
The second case to reach a court of appeal was Aiello v. Providian
Financial Corp.18 5 In Judge Posner's opinion, the Seventh Circuit
reached a contrary result to Kaneb. Aiello had filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy and listed an unsecured debt of $1,000 to the defendant
credit card company. 86 The creditor asked her to reaffirm the debt
when she filed for bankruptcy, or else they would charge her with
fraud. 8 7 Aiello did not reaffirm, but instead brought a class action suit
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc., 196 F.3d at 269.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The court stated: "In responding to Fleet's general challenge to the sufficiency of the
damages evidence, we note that emotional damages qualify as 'actual damages' under § 362(h)"
(citing Holden v. IRS (In re Holden), 226 B.R. 809, 812 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998) ('Emotional dis-
tress is an actual injury .... Legitimate human emotions are brought to bear when one's rights
are trampled on.'); In re Carrigan, 109 B.R. 167, 170 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1989) ('The debtor's
actual injury here is somewhat imprecise, but it is real-and, it is certainly the result of [the credi-
tor's actions].')). Id.
181. Fleet Mortgage Group, Inc., 196 F.3d at 269-70.
182. Id. at 269.
183. Id. at 270.
184. Id.
185. 239 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001).
186. Id. at 878.
187. Id. The allegation of fraud is the willful violation of the stay.
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on behalf of other "similarly situated victims of the defendant's al-
leged harassment."'' 88 The bankruptcy court dismissed the suit be-
cause her only evidence of injury was an affidavit which stated that
she "'cried, felt nauseous and scared and the letter caused her to quar-
rel with her husband... Even after her meeting with her attorney, Ms.
Aiello was still frightened.' 1 89 The bankruptcy court granted sum-
mary judgment for the creditor and denied the debtor's request for
damages for her emotional injury.'90
After Judge Posner acknowledged that purely emotional injury is a
part of actual damages, he stated that "whether their award is author-
ized by the statute is a separate question, one not addressed in Fleet
Mortgage, the defendant apparently having waived it."' 19 The court
operated under the assumption that the creditor had willfully violated
the stay, because they had threatened to charge the debtor with fraud
if she did not waive her right to discharge.' 92 Therefore, it turned to
the question of whether purely emotional damages could be recovered
under section 362(h). 193
The court emphasized that §362 provided for financial protection
and "not protection of peace of mind."' 194 He noted:
The Bankruptcy Code was not drafted with reference to the emo-
tional incidents of bankruptcy, however, and bankruptcy judges are
not selected with reference to their likely ability to evaluate claims
of emotional injury. That is not to suggest that victims of tortious
infliction of emotional distress in the course of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding are orphans of the law. A creditor who resorts to extortion
or intimidation exposes himself to a suit under state tort law. The
automatic stay is not an obstacle, because it does not apply to suits
by the debtor. [citations omitted] t 95
The court explained that if the creditor had convinced the debtor to
give up her right to discharge that the court would have awarded fi-
nancial damages necessary to put her back to her rightful position
(i.e., before the violation). 196 However, in this case, the creditor only
threatened her and she did not give up her right to discharge. There-
188. Id.
189. Aiello, 239 F.3d at 878. It is quite possible that this suit was dismissed because it was such
a weak case of emotional distress. Everyone cannot be compensated every time they get upset.
In addition, the meeting with her attorney makes it less likely that the debtor was scared because
she should have been reassured that the creditor could not take the threatened actions lawfully.
190. Id.
t9t. Id.
192. Id. at 879.
193. Aiello, 239 F.3d at 879-82.
194. Id. at 879.
195. Id. at 879-80.
196. Id. at 880.
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fore, the only damages that she suffered were purely economic dam-
ages. The court noted that if there had been financial loss, along with
the economic injury, then the "clean-up doctrine" of equity "might
allow the court to 'top-off' relief designed to redress any financial in-
jury inflicted by the violation of the automatic stay with an award of
damages for incidental harms," including damages for emotional dis-
tress. 197 The court concluded that "[n]o financial injury is alleged in
this case, and we do not think that emotional injury is compensable
under section 362(h) when there is no financial loss to hitch it to by
means of the clean-up doctrine."' 98 Finally, the court noted that the
plaintiff still could gain redress for her emotional injury through tradi-
tional tort remedies.' 99 Therefore, the debtor was not allowed to re-
cover for her alleged emotional damages. 20
0
V. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES IN NON-BANKRUPTCY CASES
With the emergence of damage awards compensating debtors for
willful violations of the automatic stay in the last few years, it is useful
to compare the standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress
in non-bankruptcy cases.20 1 Many of the emotional damage awards in
the bankruptcy cases did not require medical testimony where the
conduct was egregious or outrageous.20 2 The question thus becomes:
Do courts which are considering emotional damage awards in non-
bankruptcy cases require medical testimony in order to substantiate a
person's alleged injuries? Or are the non-bankruptcy cases similar to
cases where there has been a willful violation of the automatic stay
and, in some cases, emotional damages may be presumed because of
the outrageousness of a person's conduct?
Section 312 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains liability
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress:
If the actor intentionally and unreasonably subjects another to emo-
tional distress which he should recognize as likely to result in illness
197. Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880. The court noted that Fleet Mortgage may have been that type of
case. Id.
198. Id. The court then noted that emotional injuries are easily feigned and that the plaintiff's
litigating strategy, a large class action designed to induce a quick settlement, in this case rein-
forced the common law's concern about the abuse of claims for emotional damages. Id.
199. Id. at 881.
200. Id.
201. This section will be limited to discussion for damages for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and will not discuss damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress, as the
conduct is not typically outrageous and medical testimony is almost always required.
202. See, e.g., In re Carrigan, 109 B.R. 167 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1989); In re Jacobs, 100 B.R. 357
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Fisher v. Blackstone Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Fisher), 144 B.R. 237
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1992).
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or other bodily harm, he is subject to liability to the other for an
illness or other bodily harm of which the distress is a legal cause, (a)
although the actor has no intention of inflicting such harm, and (b)
irrespective of whether the act is directed against the other or a
third person. 203
Section 46 further explains that extreme and outrageous conduct is
necessary in order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.2114 The elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress
are fairly consistent in all states. In general, the elements of the tort
are: (1) intentional or reckless conduct; (2) the conduct was outra-
geous or extreme; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and
the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was severe.20 5
Courts are split over whether medical testimony is required in order
to prove that the emotional distress suffered was severe.20 6 However,
as the conduct becomes more egregious or outrageous, courts are will-
ing to assume that the emotional damages suffered are severe without
203. RESTArEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 312 (1965).
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 (1965). Cmt. d states, " Generally, the case is
one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' The liability clearly does
not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other triviali-
ties." Id. cmt. d.
205. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 819 (Cal. 1993) (finding the
same requirements but consolidating them into a three-part test and holding that "[c]onduct to
be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized
community. The defendant must have engaged in 'conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged
in with the realization that injury will result.'"); Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.
1993) (adopting the Restatement formula and quoting from Comment d that "liability for outra-
geous conduct should be found 'only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community"'); McSwain v. Shei, 402 S.E.2d 890,
891 (S.C. 1991) (finding same requirements and adding "the emotional distress suffered by the
plaintiff was 'severe' so that 'no reasonable man could be expected to endure it"'); Cohn-Fran-
kel v. United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, 667 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (App. Div. 1998)
(same).
206. See, e.g., Gordon v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 241 F.3d 997, 1001 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding
that under Missouri law, a plaintiff must "produce evidence in the form of expert medical testi-
mony that the emotional distress or mental injury was medically diagnosed and of sufficient
severity as to be medically significant"); Macsenti v. Becker, 237 F.3d 1223, 1242-43 (10tb Cir.
2001 ) (holding that under Oklahoma law, "[t]he extreme and outrageous character of the defen-
dant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress episodes took place. Expert medi-
cal testimony ordinarily is not required where damages for emotional distress are present. In
most cases, jurors from their own experience are aware of the extent and character of the disa-
greeable emotions that may result from a defendant's outrageous conduct"); Ball v. Joy Mfg.
Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344, 1370 (S.D. W. Va. 1990) (finding that plaintiffs do not have to provide
medical testimony in order to show that their emotional distress was severe but that medical
testimony would certainly strengthen their claim).
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the need for medical testimony.207 Therefore, emotional damages are
often awarded without the need for medical testimony in non-bank-
ruptcy cases where the conduct is extremely outrageous or egregious.
This parallels the award of such damages in bankruptcy cases where
the violation of the stay is willful and the conduct is egregious. 20 8
VI. CONCLUSION
Many questions remain about when and to what extent emotional
damages will be awarded in bankruptcy cases. It is clear that the
debtor has the burden of proving a creditor's willful violation of the
automatic stay in order to recover damages under § 362(h). However,
it is not clear what standard debtors must use to show a willful viola-
tion; preponderance or clear and convincing evidence. This article has
discussed cases in which emotional damages were and were not
awarded for a willful violation. What seems to emerge is a pattern of
punishing a creditor when the willful violation of the stay is especially
egregious. Some courts would not allow emotional damages without
accompanying medical testimony. However, if the creditor's conduct
is deemed reprehensible, then most courts will award punitive dam-
ages in place of emotional damages, where medical testimony is not
offered. Either way, the debtor is compensated for the creditor's will-
ful violation and any embarrassment, humiliation, or anxiety that the
creditor's conduct has caused. In other cases where emotional dam-
ages were awarded without medical testimony, two themes emerged:
1) the creditor's conduct was so outrageous that the court essentially
took judicial notice that the creditor's actions caused emotional dis-
tress; and 2) the creditor was the government and their egregious con-
duct had to be punished. Since punitive damages are not available
against the government, courts may be more willing to award damages
for emotional distress as an element of actual damages when the
debtor has clearly been harmed. The central theme of this article has
been that courts are willing to award damages for emotional distress,
207. See, e.g., Macsenti, 237 F.3d at 1223-27, 1242-43 (holding that where a dentist was so
intoxicated that he passed out several times during the procedure and severely overmedicated
the plaintiff, medical testimony was not required to establish the severity of the emotional dis-
tress); Motsenbocker v. Potts, 863 S.W.2d 126, 134-36 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding in a civil
rights case that the testimony of the plaintiff and his wife was sufficient to support a jury verdict
for intentional infliction of emotional distress where the plaintiff's health insurance deductible
was raised so high that he believed he effectively did not have insurance any longer).
208. See Fisher v. Blackstone Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Fisher), 144 B.R. 237 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1992)
(awarding emotional damages without the need for medical testimony where a creditor repos-
sessed the debtors vehicle at a § 341 hearing, even after being warned several times that his
conduct was violating the automatic stay).
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in both bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy cases, under the appropriate
circumstances. Eventually, the questions left open by this article will
begin to flesh themselves out as more courts of appeal consider the
question and, hopefully, the Supreme Court will evaluate those deci-
sions and lay out clearer rules.
